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THE PORT OF BOSTON: A MARITIME STRATEGY
massport
/■ ^ r f- i
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THE PORT OF BOSTON; A MARITIME STRATEGY .
PREFACE 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Massport's Role 2
Goals and Objectives 3
Summary of Findings ^
II. THE ROLE OF THE PORT AND BENEFITS TO THE REGION '' ^J
III. BOSTON'S MARKET
A. General Cargo 12
B. Neo-bulk Cargo 21
C. Bulk Cargo 22
IV. THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
A. Cargo Forecasts 23
B. Maritime Industry Trends 25
C. Regulatory Trends 25
D. Development Plans at Competing Ports 26
E. Labor 27
V. DESCRIPTIONS AND CAPACITY OF PORT TERMINALS
A. Port Development Program 29
B. Terminal Capacity 29
C. Moran Container Terminal 30
D. Conley Marine Terminal 32
E. Massport Marine Terminal 34
F. Future Terminal Demand 36
Massachusetts Port Authority
99 High Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02110
(617) 482-2930
I. INTRODUCTION
Massport's Role
The Massachusetts Port Authority, a quasi-governmental
Authority supported entirely by revenues from its own facilities,
was created by act of the Massachusetts legislature in 1956. The
mandate given at its creation was to modernize and revitalize two
commercial transportation facilities critical to commerce in New
England: Logan Airport and the public terminals of the Port of
Boston. The Authority is responsible for the planning,
development, operations, and maintenance of the original Port
properties and additional properties acquired by lease or
purchase since 1956.
In the twenty-five years since 1956 the maritime industry has
undergone dramatic technological change in the handling of
general cargo: from traditional labor intensive handling of
break-bulk cargo at finger piers and waterfront cargo sheds to
highly mechanized handling of containerized cargo across modern
wharves supported by open storage yards.
This revolution in cargo handling has had enormous impact on
the operations and faciliities of all U.S. ports. Ports have
been required to adjust labor arrangements, construct costly new
container terminals and grapple with the redevelopment of finger
piers physically unsuited for container cargo handling.
The industry changes resulted in shifts in Boston's maritime
trade and changes in its waterfront development and usage
patterns .
In I960 the Port handled general cargo at seven breakbulk
piers. In 1980, although tonnage through the Port has increased,
only one of these piers continues as an active general cargo
terminal. The remaining piers, technologically obsolete, have
been replaced by modern port facilities at a cost of more than
$75 million to the Port Authority.
Since 1976 Massport has made development of its port
properties a major priority. Recognizing the changing
requirements of the maritime industry, Massport has developed a
two-pronged strategy for its waterfront properties. This
strategy can be briefly summarized as follows:
1) to promote commerce in the region by developing
modern port facilities with capacity to meet the
growing needs of the regional economy;
2) to return to economically productive uses those
waterfront properties which have fallen into disuse
and disrepair as a result of market and technology
trends .
- 2 -
Goals and Objectives .
Massport's maritime mission can be stated as follows:
1) To develop maritime related cargo facilities and to
ensure that they are operated in a viable manner, ensuring the
ability to handle the demands of export/import cargoes generated
by the economies of the City of Boston, the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts and the New England region.
2) To provide the marketing capability and expertise
required to attract additional, regularly scheduled direct vessel
calls to meet existing and future cargo demands on all major
world maritime trading routes.
3) This mission must be constrained by the need to generate
sufficient revenues from maritime activities to avoid operating
deficits and to increase contribution to overhead costs. While
the Authority is prepared to invest maintenance funds necessary
to sustain operations, it will require market-based justification
for major capital improvements.
As with all Massport facilities, terminals must be developed
and operated so as to minimize adverse impacts on adjacent
communities and the natural environment.
Five major policy objectives will guide port development
decisions. They can be summarized by the following statements:
(1) Development : Development of container handling
facilities will be given priority as necessary to meet the need
of the New England economy for "load center" container terminal
services and supporting port infrastructure. Expansion of
container and other port facilities will be undertaken
incrementally as justified by market demand from new (or
expanding) carrier service. Construction design and
environmental permitting will be undertaken in anticipation of
demand to achieve a balance between time and cost in future port
development .
(2) Management : Massport will redirect the focus of its
maritime activities from terminal operation to facility
development and targeted marketing.
(3) Financial : Massport's historic operating assumption of
maritime facilities as "loss leaders" subsidizing the regional
economy will be replaced by a requirement that terminal rates be
set to recover operating and capital costs and to make increasing
contributions to overhead. Future terminals will only be
developed if the labor situation can be improved to allow
competitive rates and a financially sound position for the
Authority.
3 -
(^) Marketing ; Massport will agressively market the Port of
Boston to carriers providing service on trade routes not now
directly served from Boston. The new port terminals at Conley
Terminal and the Naval Annex will be used to attract these new
carriers to Boston as well as to strengthen important existing
carriers.
(5) Waterfront Revitalization : Plans will be developed to
return waterfront facilities , oBsolete for cargo handling, to
economically productive uses. In all cases the development will
produce revenues sufficient to cover operating, capital, and
overhead costs and to reduce the overhead borne by cargo handling
facilities.
Based on these goals and objectives, the key questions
addressed by the Maritime Strategy Project were:
Do New England shippers need additional port
service and capacity and will they benefit from it?
Can Massport afford to meet the demand, or will
increased cargo volume simply increase the port's
deficit?
If expansion will result in increased deficits can
these deficits be justified by the economic benefit
to the city, state and region?
As a result of Booz Allen's analysis of the New England
market, competitive ports, and the costs to carriers of serving
Boston, the Authority is in a better position to answer these
questions than a year ago. Booz Allen's market conclusions are,
on balance, positive. Clear opportunities for growth have been
identified. However obstacles to the port's growth exist, some
beyond Boston's control.
Summary of Findings
Boston is New England's major port and the only
port in the region providing a full range of
container handling services.
In 1979 appr^oximately 1.8 million tons of maritime
general cargo was shipped in or out of New England.
More than 90J of this cargo was containerized. The
market is highly concentrated; 76% originates or
terminates within 55 miles of Boston. (Report 1)
^3% of this tonnage was handled at the Port of
Boston; 31% through New York and the remainder
through west coast, Canadian or smaller New England
ports. (Report 1)
- 4 -
Boston's location guarantees that the port will
always face stiff competition for service and cargo
from New York, west coast and Canadian ports.
Within New England, Providence, Portland and
Portsmouth are all planning to profit from Boston's
operational and labor problems to capture a portion
of the New England market. (Report 1)
New England's cargo is traded primarily with
countries in North Europe (50%) and the Far East
(23%). (Report 1)
In 1979 the operations of Boston's public terminals
contributed more than $425 million to the regional
economy. Containerized cargo is the cargo
resulting in the highest direct economic impact per
acre utilized: $1.6 million per acre.
The major beneficiaries of activity at the Port of
Boston are the more than 3600 individuals and 170
firms which provide services at the Port. Their
port related revenue is more than $155 million a
year. Public terminals account for 60% of these
activities. Secondary benefits flow to
Massachusetts and New England shippers and
consignees. (Report M)
Surveys of New England shippers, review of port
tariffs and analysis of present shipping patterns
indicate that New England shippers recognize more
than $22 million in annual savings by shipping
through Boston and that the key to increased market
share through Boston is increased direct carrier
service. (Reports 3 4 7)
Low labor productivity, high labor costs and the
ILA's general unwillingness to participate in port
growth are the greatest barriers to increased
carrier service. Boston's labor is 40% less
productive and its labor-based terminal handling
charge 25% higher than competitive ports. (Report
9)
The high costs and heavy use of Moran Terminal have
made carriers reluctant to initiate new service
through Boston despite their interest in carrying
New England's high value cargo. (Report 5)
New England's general cargo is forecast to grow
5.5% annually in the next twenty years.
Maintaining only its present market share, Boston's
tonnage would exceed two million tons by the end of
this century. (Report 2)
5 -
To meet this demand, Boston will be required to
expand container handling capacity at Conley
Terminal through the 1980's and build additional-
capacity at the Massport Marine Terminal in the
1990's. Increased market share may require
accelerated investment . (Report 10)
The container capacity added by the new Berth at
Conley provides an opportunity to attract new and
expanded carrier service to Boston. Massport's
primary marketing effort will therefore focus on
the ocean carrier market. New service will attract
increased cargo volumes and bring new jobs and
revenues to the waterfront. (Report 5)
Analysis of other ports indicates a strong
correlation between a port's financial performance
and its distance from direct terminal operations,
particularly labor negotiations. In the future
Massport will enter into lease or terminal
operating agreements with private operators
wherever possible. (Report 11)
Booz Allen cautions that a leasing policy may be
difficult to implement in Boston and suggests
formation of a non-profit corporation to operate
Boston's public terminals. (Report 11)
Port development in the 1980's will focus on
incremental expansion of container handling
capacity at Conley Terminal to meet market demand
and development of the new Massport Marine Terminal
Complex in South Boston for bulk and break-bulk
cargo.
In the 1990's the 46 acre Massport Marine Terminal,
now under development at the former South Boston
Naval Annex, will be converted as required to meet
market demand for container handling, doubling the
container capacity of the Port of Boston.
A viable port requires cargo, facilities, and service.
Boston has both the cargo potential and the facilities.
Competitive rates and labor moderation are keys to attracting new
and expanded service. The cooperation of the port, business, and
residential communities is essential to attracting new service,
recapturing Boston's market, and realizing the potential of the
port's new and developing terminal facilities and their benefit
to the city and region.
- 6 -
II. THE ROLE OF THE PORT AND BENEFITS TO THE REGION
The Port of Boston is New England's major seaport providing
all the services shippers expect for fast and efficient cargo
handling. A source of jobs and commerce for the entire region,
more than 25 million tons of cargo, worth nearly $7 billion, are
handled annually in the Port.
In a national context Boston ranks twelfth in terms of
containerized tonnage and 25th in terms of total foreign trade
general cargo tonnage. (8-1 and 8-2)*
The Port of Boston, with its natural deep-water harbor,
^0 foot deep channels, and modern terminal facilities, is able to
accommodate the world's most modern shipping vessels. Boston is
served by 24 steamship lines, providing frequent regularly
scheduled service to 175 worldwide ports.
Two railroads - the Boston and Maine, and Conrail - and an
easily reached interstate highway network link the seaport to all
parts of New England as well as to the Mid-Atlantic, the Midwest,
and eastern Canada.
Private facilities in the Port of Boston include a variety of
terminals, piers, berths, and shipyards located in the city of
Boston and in the neighboring communities of Chelsea, Everett,
Quincy, Revere, and Winthrop. Bulk commodities including
petroleum, scrap metal, sugar, and gypsum are handled by private
terminal facilities.
The Port's major public general cargo terminals, Moran
Terminal, Paul Conley Marine Terminal and the Massport Marine
Terminal complex in South Boston, are owned and operated by the
Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport). Massport's public
terminals handle general cargos such as lumber, automobiles, and
high value containerized goods including machinery, computer
components, photographic equipment, paper products, and consumer
goods .
Massport has focused on the development of container handling
facilities for the past ten years because 90% of the general
cargo moving through the Port of Boston is containerized. Only
certain port properties are suitable for handling containerized
cargo because of the need for marginal berthing, large dockside
cranes, and large expanses of open area near the berth needed for
storage of containers. The industry standard for container
terminals recommends a facility of at least 50 open acres behind
a 1000 foot marginal wharf served by two container cranes.
*Numbers in parentheses throughout this report refer to individual
Booz Allen working papers completed as part of Massport's Maritime
Strategy Project during 1980 and 1981.
- 7 -
- 8 -
Of the original Port Properties conveyed to Massport in 1956
Hoosac Pier, Mystic Pier, East Boston Piers 1-5i Commonwealth
Pier and Conley Terminal only Conley Terminal meets these
optimum criteria. Recognizing the physical limitations of the
original Port properties, Massport has acquired property more
suitable for container terminal development. Land in Charlestown
was acquired for the development of Moran Terminal in the late
1960's and in 1979 the Authority signed a long term lease for
development of a marine terminal at the former South Boston Naval
Annex .
The role of Massport is to serve as a catalyst for economic
growth for the region by providing modern port facilities for the
intermodal transfer of New England export and import cargo
between land and water carriers.
Economic Benefits of the Port's Public Terminals
In 1979 the operations of Boston's public port terminals
contributed more than $425 million to the regional economy.
These economic benefits can be divided into three categories:
First, shipment of export and import cargo through Boston's
port facilities directly creates jobs on the waterfront and
generates revenues for local firms and individuals participating
directly in the port's activities such as stevedores,
longshoremen, ship repair firms, etc. These benefits can be
measured in jobs created and revenues earned.
The direct economic benefit associated with public terminals
in the Port of Boston was nearly $100 million in 1979- This
represents the annual revenues of the more than 170 firms
employing over 2000 people who are directly involved in the
general cargo activities of the port. The benefit associated
with activities at Boston's public terminals represent
approximately 60% of the impact attributable to the port as a
whole. (M-3)
The second category of economic benefit resulting from
availability of public port facilities in Boston is
transportation savings to New England shippers. These are
savings realized because shippers are able to use Boston rather
than a more distant port. New England shippers surveyed
indicated that they saved from $10 to $33 a ton by shipping
through Boston. This results in over $22 million annually in
transportation savings. (4-3 and 4-5)
Of the public port's direct economic impact, 51J is related
to the fixed operation of the port and does not vary with cargo
volume. The remaining 49J, approximately $49 million in 1979, is
variable depending on cargo volumes and vessel calls. (Table 4-4)
- 9 -
Booz Allen reviewed the major cargo operations at the port's
public terminals and analyzed the economic impact attributable to
each. This analysis reveals that stacked container handling
provides the highest economic impact per acre utilized, $1.6
million, while automobiles result in the greatest benefit on a
per ton basis, $117.09. C^-S and ^-9)
DIRECT ECONOMIC IMPACTS BY CARGO TYPE •
IMPACTS
Moran
Contalnera
Sea Land
Contalnera
Caitla
liland
Breakbulk
MYatlc
Pier
AutOB
Urect Ispact
per ton
$26.11
$27.12
$36.13
$62.74
$18.66
$117.09
Traniportatlon
Saving! ptr ton
27.00
555.11
27.00
$54.12
27.00
$63.13
3.20
$65.94
3.50
$22.16
Total Impact
per ton
$117.09
Total 1979 Tonnage
(000' I of ton»)
580
125
56
31
35
46
Total Iicptct
(OOO'a of DoUan)
$ 29.5AS
$6,765
$3,535
$3,363
$ 776
$5,386
Storage
Acrei Utilised
22
10
10
S
14
30
Impact Per Acre
(OOO'a of Dollara)
$1,628
$677
$354
$673
$ 55
$180
* Eaied on veiael diaburiement account!. Sunmar; of tabic! 4-3, 4-4. 4-S and 4-6.
The third category of benefits are the indirect benefits to
other businesses and to the general public as a result of the
multiplier or "ripple" effect of the direct revenues. Booz Allen
did not calculate the multiplier impact of port activities.
However a multiplier of 2.5 is customarily used in assessing the
economic i.-npact of a port. This results in an additional annual
impact of $305 million.
Public Operations in the Port of Boston
Container Operations: The Port of Boston is one of the five
major ports on the North Atlantic coast of the United States with
terminal facilities for handling containerized ocean cargo.
In 1981 twenty-six international ocean carriers handle
containers at the Port's terminals. Fourteen of these lines
serve Boston directly. Three lines serve Boston with dedicated
weekly feeder vessels, two via Halifax and one via New York. The
remaining nine carriers serve Boston via the weekly McAllister
Barge to New York.
-10-
Container volumes for the period 1976-1981 are shown in the
table below:
Fiscal year Full
(July - June) Containers
1976 35,390
1977. 113,192
1978^ ')2,918
1979 51,138
1980- 53,068
1981 19,280
- ILA strike - October and Kovember 1977
- ILA slowdown - November and December 1980 resulting in
vessel diversions
Total
Container
Containers
Tonnage
17,808
195,969
56,898
619,070
57,330
619,855
70,381
711,2^9
70,356
769,336
58.283
757,889
Breakbulk and Neo-Bulk Operations: Breakbulk (non-containerized)
general cargo and neo-bulk cargos such as automobiles and lumber
are handled at Conley Terminal in South Boston. Breakbulk
tonnage has declined in the past ten years with the increase of
containerization . The level of automobile and lumber imports has
historically been highly cyclical, depending upon such factors as
the general health of the economy, the state of the building
industry (particularly' new home starts), and international
agreements regarding import restrictions.
OOO's of
Gross
Break
Fiscal
Year
Auto
Lumber
Board Feet
bulk
(July -
June)
Tonnage
1 of Autos
Tonnage
of Lumber
Tonnage
1976
12,358
UD.HtO
28,171
32.537
78,173
1977
Uii,2Bt
i42,006
19.131
56,150
55,172
1978
52,027
te,697
15,787
52.325
73,658
197 9
50,819
U7,011
39.355
1JJ.977
65,911
1980
K9,9H9
15,793
27.683
31,638
26,521;
1981
69,570
61,053
27,711
31.672
l«,68t
It is assumed that these commodities will continue to be
handled through Boston at either the Conley Terminal or the
Kassport Marine Terminal and that the level of imports will
continue to fluctuate cyclically.
-11-
III. BOSTON'S MARKET
The six New England states, excluding southwest Connecticut,
are the Port of Boston's primary market. In 1979 this New
England market generated more than five million tons of
waterborne import and export cargo (excluding petroleum
products). This included 1,800,000 tons of containerized and
breakbulk general cargo, 700,000 tons of neo-bulk cargo and
2,800,000 tons of non-petroleum bulk cargo. These three cargo
segments are described below. (1-2, 1-14 and 1-20)
A. General Cargo
Market area: New England general cargo shippers and
consignees are highly concentrated around Boston. 76% of New
England cargo originates or terminates within 55 miles of Boston.
72% of New England cargo has a Massachusetts origin or
destination. Boston is the region's major port. (1-3)
tmlmt
tnm ftqlM^ dBilatlw
|MU« toVMI* 99TI Mflji
tn
m
Volume :
million
4DJ exported.
In 1979 New England generated an estimated 1.8
tons of general cargo. 60% of this cargo is imported and
More than 90J is containerized. (1-2)
-12-
Commodities; New England's general cargo market is highly
diversified and includes a range of high value commodities,
reflecting New England's economic base and consumption patterns.
(1-11)
Exports
Estimated New England Comnon Carrier Market
by Commodity With Boston's Market Share
(Thousands of Tons) (Table 1-11)
Commodity Group
Chemicals
Metal manufactures
Forest & paper products
Manufactured goods
Crude, raw materials
Scrap
Machinery
Textile & textile products
Food & food products
Leather & hides
New England
Boston' s
Boston's
Tonnage
Tonnage
61
Share (1)
112
t5t
136
9
7
112
60
71
78
HQ
51
57
30
5«
56
29
52
Ht
U
30
39
IB
ii6
25
12
US
21
U
56
TT?
3TD
t;
Imports
Estimated New England Common Carrier
Market by Commodity With Boston's Market Share
(Thousands of Tons) (Table 1-12)
Comrrodity Group
Consumer goods
Crude, raw materials
Food & food products
Iron & steel products
Machiner y
Forest & wood products
Chemicals
Manufactured goods
Metal manufactures
New England
Boston
Boston' s
Tonnage
Tonnage
162
Sh
are (»)
'<36
37
210
60
29
158
102
65
75
16
21
60
36
60
56
iiO
71
UD
25
63
10
20
50
20
1095
11
175
70
13
-13-
Trading Partners; Countries of Europe and the Far East are
New England's major trading partners, accounting for 80% of the
total general cargo tonnage. (1-9)
Australia
New Zealani
diterranean
America
1979 NEW ENGLAND GENERAL CARGO
Boston's Market Share: ^3% of New England's general cargo is
shipped through the Port of Boston. This is a lower market share
than might be expected for a major port from its primary market
area. Boston's share is even more concentrated than the overall
New England market: 771 .of Boston's market is within Route ^495
and 92% is within 55 miles of the port. The ex port/ import
balance, commodity mix, and foreign origin/destination
cargo
1-3)
reflect the composition of the New England market
of Boston
. (1-2 and
BOSTON'S SHAR£ OF THE NEW ENGLAND MARKET
(Table 1-5)
Estimated
Percentage
Estimated
Boston's
New England
of
Boston
Market
Metropolitan
Area
TonnaRe(OOO's)
Total
Tonnage
12.00'
'«) Share
Inside Route
: 128
724
ItOZ
377
52Z
Rte 128 to Rte «95
362
20Z
228
63Z
Hartford
235
13Z
24
lOZ
Providence
127
72
24
19Z
Worcester
72
4Z
55
76Z
Rutland VT
36
2Z
-
-
Nashua NH
36
2Z
24
67Z
Chlcopee
18
IZ
8
MX
Springfield
IB
IZ
8
44Z
Barre VT
18
IZ
8
44Z
Fall River
16
IZ
8
44Z
Webster
18
IZ
8
442
SUBTOTAL
1.682
93Z
772
43Z
Other Areas
128
72
13
102
TOTAL
1.810
1002
-14-
785
43Z
Carriers serving the New England market have several choices
for handling the region's cargo:
(1) direct call at Boston
(2) feeder or barge service from Boston or from a smaller
New England port to New York or Halifax
(3) truck to New York or Montreal
m) rail to west coast ports (mlnlbrldge service) -
(6-1, 6-2, and 6-3)
ALTERNATIVE MODES FOR SERVING
THE NEW ENGLAND MARKET
Direct all water
■ Barge or feeder
Truck
Rail to west coast
-15-
Boston is the port traditionally used by carriers to serve
the New England market. Boston is served directly or by feeder
by a cross section of the largest container operators in the
world. In 1979 fourteen carriers called at the Port of Boston
with direct service. Ten others served Boston in relayed service
via common carrier barge or their own feeder vessels. (5-1il)
The
England
feeder ,
table below summarizes the major carriers handling New
cargo in 1979 and estimates their relative use of direct,
and truck/rail service.
TOP 15 CARRIER-'! OF WEU KNrT^AMD CONTAINER CARGO - 1979 *
Share of Primary Direct Feeder/ T^ruck or rail I of Prequency wui
New England Trade From Barge from thru ocher Bostcn's Type of Boston
Market Route Boston Boston Ports Itamage Service
Sea land
U. S. Lines
Aa
Trans nreig^ Lines
Farrell
APL
Barber Blue Sea
Japanese ConsortiuD
Colmtus
^toersk
OrioiC Overseas
Acr/PAO:
Hapag Lloyd
Dart
Italian
OCtKT
♦Based on Tables 5-6,
15. K
6.71
6.U
6.01
4.6J
4.01
3.31
2.9%
2.41
2.41
2.31
2.21
2.11
2.11
2.01
35. n
1001
5-7. 5-8. 5-9.
North Europe
North Europe
North Europe
ferth Europe
Austral ta/tC
Hediterrsnean
Far East
Far East
For East
AusCralla/NZ
For East
Far East
Australia/>C
North Europe
North Europe
tfediterranean
751
901
101
501
401
751
751
501
751
301
25X
251
251
7S1
351
251
251
251
701
lOX
651
1001
SOI
351
251
1001
751
2S1
251
651
251
18.51
U.81
2.41
24.51
31
21
U.ll
2.41
3.21
2.91
1.81
4.41
m
1001
Ueekly feeder
via New York
Weekly Direct
Weeldy barpe via
Nu York
Ueekly Direct
Ueekly barge via
New York
Ns all uater
•ervlce
IVice a mnch
direct
ttxithly direct
weekly barge
IVice a ncnch
direct
lb all uater
•ervlce
Ifeekly barge via
liktU a ncnch
direct
Weekly Feeder
via Halifax
Weekly barf>e via
W1&& a ncnth
direct
5-10. 5-11 and terminal records
-16-
Carriers were interviewed regarding their method of handling
New England cargo, particularly whether or not to call directly
in Boston. These interviews indicated that decisions about
service are strongly influenced by carriers' perception of
Boston's unstable labor situation and resulting high terminal
costs. The advantages and disadvantages of serving Boston
directly, as perceived by the carriers, are summarized below:
(5-16)
Advantages Disadvantages
Only New England port capable of . Unstable labor situation and^
handling a large "direct" con- resultant high costs
tainer service
One day closer to Europe than . First port of loading east-
to other principal Atlantic ports bound
Inland freight savings accrue to . Rail rate levels unfavorable
the carriers customers on the compared to New York and
order of Baltimore for mid-west cargo
and rail service to port area
$350 per container compared inadequate
to New York
$600 per container compared to
Montreal
First port of discharge westbound
The incremental cost of a direct Boston call for New England
cargo vs. barge or truck to New York varies depending upon the
type of vessel (its size and fuel consumption), its itinerary
(added costs for a vessel enroute to Europe or Canada are less
than for one terminating in New York), and the value and volume
of cargo handled by the carrier. Baseline costs were estimated
for each alternative. The sensitivity of each mode to rising
fuel costs was also analyzed: (6-8)
Estimated
1980
Cost per Fuel as t
Container of Cost
800 TEU Vessel Direct Call to Boston
(Table 6-«)
a. Bypass diversion $3«8 51
b. Northern diversion $550 icj
Barge to New York (Table 6-5) $527 2.7J
Truck to New York (6-28) $ioo6 11%
-17-
Assuming these costs, the breakeven number of containers was
calculated for a range of vessel sizes making direct calls vs.
barge cost at $527 a container:
Bypass Northern Diversion
Diversion of Vessel Vessel with northern
on N.y. to Europe/Canada terminus in New York
route
800 TEU Vessel (Table 6-6) 63
1200 TEU Vessel (Table 6-6) 78
150
196
These calculations do not address other components of a
carrier's decision regarding a direct call, such as vessel
scheduling and capacity, balance of equipment, or fixed costs in
New York.
Booz Allen did not analyze the comparative cost to a carrier
of all-water vs. minibridge service to the Far East or identify
breakeven volumes and factors involved in this modal choice.
Competitive Ports; Boston's competition from other ports
occurs in two areas: competition for New England cargo and
competition for carrier service.
(1) Boston's major competition for New England's cargo comes
from the ports of New York and Montreal and from minilandbr idge
service through west coast ports. Smaller New England ports such
as Portland, Portsmouth, -and Providence compete with Boston, to a
limited extent, in their local market areas. (1-12)
Competitive Ports Market Share of New England
Liner Cargo (Table 1-13)
Port
Boston
New York
Montreal
West Coast Ports via MLB
others
Estimated Share of
New England Liner Cargo
1*3%
30-325
6- 8t
5-15J
100
New England shippers surveyed by Booz Allen indicated the
following factors were most important in port selection: (1)
frequent and reliable carrier servivce; (2) efficient terminal
facilities and (3) competitive inland and ocean freight rates.
Boston's performance relative to competitive ports varies
considerably depending on market area and trade route. (7-2)
Europe and the far East, New England's major trading partners,
are discussed below.
-18-
Boston's primary competition for the European Trade is from
the ports of New York and Montreal. Boston's good direct
service, position as the first port of call westbound, and lower
overall costs to New England shippers are strong selling points.
New York offers greater frequency of service, while Montreal
offers lower rates through its CAST line service^ (7-3)
European Service Boston Boston Truck to Truck to
(tables 7-2, 7-3. and 7-H) Direct Feeder _ W.Y. Montreal
Shipper Costs
UD' container from Boston
(photo equipment)
t
2,879
$
3,696
»
3,780
»
2,700
Shipper Costs
20' container from
(abrasives)
Worce
ster
$
1,100
$
2.260
$
2,«78
$
1,155
Number of carriers
serving the port
2
6
IK
7
Average Sailings
per month
8
12
51
33
Average days
between sailings
3.7
2.5
.6
.9
Average transit days
- inbound
- outbound
9.5
1^4
15.1
16
11.2
11
11
10.9
Boston's competition in the Far East Trade comes from New York and
West Coast ports via minibridge. Minibridge is the fastest service
while Boston feeder is the least costly. (7-7)
Boston Boston Truck to Mini-
Far East Service . Direct Feeder N .Y . Bridge
(Tables 7-5, 7-6 and 7-7)
Shipper costs 10' box
from Boston (footwear) $ 2,238 $ 1,983 t 2,105 $ 2,320
Shipper costs 20' box
from Springfield
(bicycle parts)
$ 2,532
$ 1,587
t 2,713
$ 2,601
Number of carriers
serving port
1
2
13
7
Average sailings
per month
2
1
66
27
Average days
between sailings
15
7.5
.5
1.2
Average Transit Time
Outbound (to Taiwan)
26
31
32
28
Inbound (from Yokohama)
30
38
30
21
New York is Boston's main competitor for cargo on other trade
routes. In general, New York has more frequent service on all trade
routes, while trucking rates are lower to the Port of Boston. (7-11)
-19-
(2) Ports competing with Boston for carrier services include the
North Atlantic ports of New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Hampton
Roads. (7-15)
The table below compares carrier activities at these ports:
Number of
Liner Carriers
Boston 23
New York 97
Philadelphia 52
Baltimore 95
Hampton Roads 63
(Table 7-13)
Tariff charges (dockage, wharfage, and crane rental rates) for these
five ports were analyzed for the period 1970-1981. This analysis
indicated that while Boston's rates have historically been higher than
the other North Atlantic ports they are now at a competitive level.
However Boston's low labor productivity results in overall handling
charges considerably higher than the North Atlantic average. (7-30)
Comparison of 1980 Cargo Handling Costs
At Boston With Other North Atlantic Ports
(in Dollars Per Container) (Table 9-2)
CABRIER
PORT
1
2
} .
ii
Boston
$ 326
$ 216
$
le**
$ 122
New York
270
221
278
80
Baltimore
—
155
17 9
87
Philadelphi?'
189
21i)
—
—
Hampton Roads
202
155
m
—
Average
2«7
192
196
26
Boston as t of
Average
132»
113J
9tX
127»
-20-
B. Neo-Bulk Cargo — _^
Neo-bulk cargo is general cargo which is shipped in volume usually
in shipload movements of a single commodity by one shipper through a
dedicated facility. Port selection criteria are different for
neo-bulk than for containerized or break-bulk general cargo.
Competitive rates, productive productive labor arrangements, and
proximity to inland destination are more important factors in port
selection for neo-bulk cargo than the services and infrastructure of a
major port.
New England's neo-bulk was estimated at 700,000 tons in 1979
about one percent of the total U.S. neo-bulk market; it consists of a
few major commodities and is primarily an import market. The major
commodities handled as neo-bulk in New England are iron and steel
lumber, and automobiles (1-15)
Boston handles 13J of New England's neo-bulk tonnage - primarily
automobiles and lumber. Providence, Rhode Island handles a
significant volume of neo-bulk cargo, particularly iron and steel
lummber, and autos. (1-16) Bananas are imported to New England through
specialized facilities at the Port of New York, United Brand's
northeast distribution center. (1-19)
The table below provides a breakdown of
neo-bulk commodities in 1979 and the percentage
(Tables 1-15 and 1-16)
New England's major
handled by each port:
EXPORTS
ESTDVJH)
rCKWGE (1979)
hCVUrc Hi NEO-
BULK SHU^E.TS
Woodpulp
Paperboard
IMPORTS
Autos
Linnber
Iron & Steel
Bananas
60,000
20.000
130.000
150.000
200,000
100.000
371
241
41
561
761
961
61
1001
1001
251
751
-21-
C. Bulk Cargo
New England's bulk cargo tonnage (excluding petroleum
bulk fuels) was estimated at 2.6 million tons in 1979.
and other
The relatively low level of bulk cargo tonnage flowing in and out
of New England reflects the limited presence of heavy industry in the
region. New England's major bulk exports are iron and steel scrap and
tallow.
(1-20)
Major bulk imports include sugar, gypsum, and road salt.
Port choice by bulk cargo shippers is very strongly influenced by
proximity to the inland origin or destination and by low labor and
port costs. Boston handled M8J of this market in 1979. (1-21) Bulk
commodities are shipped through privately operated terminals, sometime
directly at the shipper's plant, such as the gypsum plant in
Charlestown .
The table below summarizes New England's non-petroleum bulk market
in 1979 and the percentage handled by each port, (tables 1-20 and
1-21)
EXPORTS
NEV ENGLAND
ESTOVaZD
TaCJACE (19793
z
e
i
z
>
o
H
K
O
2
§
o
u
03
z
2
z
S
»
u
z
Iron & Steel Scrap
Fig Iron
Tallow
1.400.000
20.000
33,000
1.453.000
50%
100%
100%
43%
7%
IMPORTS
Sugar
Gypsum
Salt
Iron Ore Cone.
Frozen Fish
400,000
350.000
550.000
70.000
50.000
1.420 000
90%
45%
20%
100%
15%
9%
29%
46%
36%
3%
977
L0%
■22-
IV. THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT: OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES TO
FUTURE GROWTH ^
Cargo volumes through Boston will be affected by trends and
developments in the maritime industry and in the external
environment within which the port operates. Areas which were
investigated by Booz Allen included: regional cargo forecasts,
maritime industry trends, regulatory trends, service and
development at competitive ports, and labor productivity in
Boston. The highpoints of this analysis are summarized below.
A. Cargo Forecasts: Boston cargo volumes are likely to increase
in two ways: growth in New England's total market and growth in
Boston's market share.
( 1 ) Growth based on New England Market Growth
General cargo tonnage shipped through Boston is projected to
grow at an average annual rate of 5.5?, assuming that Boston
maintains its present share of the New England market. (2-12)
At that rate general cargo tonnage through Boston will
increase to m million tons in 1990 and will triple by the year
2000 to 2.6 million tons. This tonnage will continue to be
primarily containerized.
These forecasts are based on econometric forecasts of
regional economic activity and analysis of foreign trade activity
for 47 major commodities representing more than 70% of New
England tonnage. (2-1 through 2-5)
The resulting forecasts are consistent with long term trade
forecasts prepared by the U.S. Maritime Administration and with
other economic projections for the national and regional economy.
(2-15 and 2-16)
(2) Growth Based on Increased Market Share
Market analysis suggests four areas for growth of Boston's
market share of New England cargo:
Boston presently handles only 56% of the import cargo
destined within Route 495, as compared to 88% of export cargo.
Increasing Boston's share of imports to 75% would increase annual
tonnage by 132,000 tons. (1-23)
The Hartford and Providence markets are secondary New England
cargo areas. The Port of Boston captures only 10% and 19% of
these markets respectively. This cargo is highly containerized
and moves on trade routes where Boston provides excellent
-23-
service. Increase of Boston's share to 70% of this market would
increase annual tonnage by 180,000 tons. (1-2^ and 1-25)
North Europe, the Far East, and the Mediterranean are the
major trade routes for future Boston growth. (1-27)
Growth in these areas would result in the following general
cargo volumes through the Port of Boston:
BOSTON GENERAL CARGO TONNAGE (COO'S OF TONS)
1960
(1) Growth In New England Market
Boston General Cargo
based on Overall 5.5X
Karket Growth
790
(2) Growth In Boston's Market Share
Improved Far East &
Med Service
Increased Share of
Imports Within «95
Increased Share of
Providence & Hartford
Tonnage
1985
1,020
76
173
235
1990
1.367
102
225
307
2000
2,612
175
361
H02
Total Potential
General Cargo 790 1,506
(Tables 2-7, 1-23, 1'-2'4 and 1-27)
2,001
3.393
SBorr
TONS
rmc*STS or >ostows
CPIRAI C*>CO TOWiAgl
>.51 AWUAl CKOWTH
,000,000.
,000,000
,000,000
,000,000
I>cr*M* ahart et
tTotHtnct i ■•rtferd Markau
tacruM ahan vltbls «t5
I^roTt far taat t Had (arrlca
MalBUls Fraaaoc Hartac (hara
IMO
lUi
1«W
-24-
ms
2000
B. Maritime Industry Trends: Excess capacity exists in
containerized shipping engaged in U.S. trades. Rates have not
increased sufficiently to cover costs which have more than
doubled in the past five years. Energy costs are responsible for
a very significant portion of this increase. Daily fuel costs
for a 13,000 TEU vessel rose from $6,000 in 1976 to $22,000 in
1980. A number of U.S. flag carriers have reduced or ceased
operations entirely as a result of poor profit performance. (5-5,
5-6 and 5-7)
The trend to larger, fully containerized vessels peaked in
the late 1970's. The present trend is to smaller, more flexible
vessels. Carriers are adopting slower speeds, converting vessels
from steam to diesel power, decreasing operating costs and
productivity of their ships and taking other measures to reduce
costs .
C. Regulatory Trends; Recent legislative and regulatory trends
were reviewed in light of their impact on secondary ports such as
Boston. The major findings are summarized below:
' Truck deregulation will make it easier for carriers to move
New England cargo over the road to other ports. A number of
steamship carriers have also received approval to own and
operate trucking operations to support their maritime
activity. (8-^)
* Changes in ocean shipping regulatory laws may provide
carriers with greater flexibility in port selection and
pricing, altering -traditional distribution and service
patterns perhaps to the detriment of secondary ports such as
Boston. Massport should increase its monitoring of proposed
legislation and regulation in this area. (8-5)
' Resolution of the controversy surrounding the 50-mile rule
will affect Massport's unprofitable business at Mystic Pier
and may result in re-opening the current ILA contract. (8-7)
* Movement toward a uniform labor contract would eliminate a
number of Boston's competitive advantages over New York.
Boston should make every effort to preserve local control
over local practices and fringe benefit programs. (8-8)
* Carriers, such as CAST, shipping through Canadian ports are
increasing penetration of the New England and midwest
markets. Massport should support proposed legislation
addressing this issue. (8-9)
* The coal export boom has resulted in proposals to dredge
several major ports to depths of 55 feet. Boston should
monitor the impact of such projects on its competitive
position in handling container and neo-bulk vessels. (8-10)
-25-
D. Development Plans at Competing Ports; During the next .five
years Boston can expect increased competition in all market
segments as facility expansion occurs at competing ports. Booz
Allen recommends countering this competition by targeting
marketing efforts to emphasize Boston's strengths. For example,
Boston's excellent inb6und service from Europe should be stressed
to high value importers while the cost advantages of Boston's
all-water Far East service should be emphasized to cost-sensitive
exporters. (7-38 and 7-39)
North Atlantic ports that compete with Boston plan to invest
more than $^30 million in container handling facilities in the
next five years. (7-18)
Ports that compete with Boston for New England's
containerized cargo (New York, Montreal and smaller New England
ports) have planned investments estimated at $330 million, mostly
in container facilities. (7-18) These are summarized in the table
below :
FORI
fSTIMMEn ANNUA! GfNtRAL
CARGO T(>NNAr.[
(000 TONS)
CURRtNl SIIARf or
NEW (NGIANU
HAIiKtl
PLANNED PUBLIC
INVESTMENT IN fAClLITIES
19ei)-198S
(In t HilHons)
COMMENTS
New York
Uj.OIMI
30-321
$?10
Will have excess capacity
through 1980-1985 period.
Porlsnouth, Nil
100 est.
2- 41
0
Could divert heavy lift
business and smII anount
of container traffic.
Haine Ports
200
O-lOl
20
Searsport to be developed
for forest products and
Portland for containers.
Providence
300
I0-12S
loi
Port specializes In
specialty conmodi ties.
Private Investiieiit
planned.
ildlirai
3.300
2- 31
23
Container Temlnal 11 to
open 1981 at cost of 129.2
■lllion.
St. John
3.000
2- 4X
24
Diversified forest products
and container facilities.
Coiiil>etes for Maine forest
products.
Montreal
10,000
6- 81
39
Three berth - 29 acre
Racine container tenrlnal
to be completed In 1981 at
cost of $20 ■III Ion.
Estimated private sector Investaent.
-26-
Ports south of New York that compete with Boston for carrier
service have planned investments in container facilities in
excess of $100 million. (7-27) Estimates of these investments are
summarized below:
Planned Port Expenditures 1980-1985
(Hillons of i) ITables ^-1§ k 7-26)
Philadelphia
Baltimore
Hampton Roads
1980
N/A
3
6.5
9.5
1981
7.7
12.5
1982
9.0
52.95
9.90
E. Labor
factor in
service and
port development.
Labor productivity and costs emerge as a critical
carriers' decisions to increase or decrease Boston
in Kassport's financial capacity to undertake further
Analysis
terminals at
concl usions :
of Boston's labor situation and that of comparable
other North Atlantic ports yielded the following
(1) Moran Terminal is H0% less productive and 25% more
costly to carriers than comparable North Atlantic
terminals. (9-1, 9-2 and 9-i4)
(2) The poor productivity and high costs are due in /
large measure to overstaf f ing . The number of '^Z-^^j^-''^
fulltime ILA terminal staff at Moran is nearly
twice that at comparable terminals as summarized /l- <^
below: (9-3) co^^
Comparison of Labor Productivity »t Five Worth Atlantic
Container Terminal* During 1979 (Table 9-1)
C<3->vC-'=-
TERMINAL
TONNAGE HANDLED
LONGSHORE HOUR
TONS/HOUR
Moran Terminal
Philadelphia Terminal 1
Philadelphia Terminal 2
Hampton Roads Terminal 1
Hampton Roads Terminal 2
581.000
556.000
581.244
868.000
1,368.000
560.630
308.000
427.533
277.217
747.600
1.04
1.81
1.36
3.13
1.83
Average
790,849
464,196
1.70
Note: Includes hours expended In consolidation aheds.
The limited land area, poor layout, and heavy use
of the terminal requiring excessive
have also contributed to Moran' s
cost problems.
overtime work
productivity and
-27-
(3) Significant cost reduction and productivity
improvements are available at Moran. A 25% expense
reduction was achieved at Mystic in the 1980-83 ILA
contract. The potential exists to achieve an
overall 28% cost reduction at Moran and Mystic.
(9-9)
m) However, any substantial labor reduction at Morao
will result in more men drawing Guaranteed Annual
Income as provided in the ILA contract. Thus,
Massport's cost reductions will be offset, to scnne
extent, by increased demand on the Union's funds.
This may in turn require an increased tonnage
assessment to carriers. An increase in overall
service and volume through the port would allow
productivity gains without loss of ILA employment
and the resulting burden on GAI funds. (9-10 and
9-11)
-28-
DESCRIPTIONS AND CAPACITY OF PORT TERMINALS
The Port of Boston's public cargo handling facilities are
concentrated in Charlestown and South Boston at three major
terminals. Development of these terminals has been an important
priority for the Authority. Massport's development program and
terminal facilities are described below.
A. Port Development Program: Since 1978, Massport has
been engaged in a three-phase development program to return the
Port's existing terminals to efficient operation and expand its
facilities to meet future needs.
The first phase, which began in 1978, involved the
rehabilitation of Moran Container Terminal and Conley Terminal.
This program, at a cost of well over $10 million, included the
replacement and the addition of cargo handling equipment at
Moran, rehabilitation of one of the container cranes at Moran,
rehabilitation of storage and berthing areas at both Moran and
Conley and the addition of land for storage of cargo at Moran.
The majority of this work has been completed.
The second phase involved the construction of a new container
area at Conley Terminal at a cost of $18 million. This project
includes a 1000-foot berth, two ilO-ton container cranes, and
initially, ten acres of land for container storage. Over
twenty-five additional acres are available for immediate
development and additional berth capacity and cranes are planned.
The recently completed terminal allows a 20% increase in the
number of containers which can be handled through public
terminals in the Port of Boston.
The third phase involves creation of a new HJ acre marine
terminal at the former South Boston Naval Annex which will be the
heart of the new South Boston Marine Terminal complex. Used in
conjunction with the port property at the Army base, Commonwealth
Flats and the former Navy Recreation property, it will serve as a
bulk and breakbulk facility during the next decade. Ultimately,
it will be developed as a three berth container terminal which
will double the Port's container capacity and offer shippers fast
and efficient cargo handling into the twenty-first century. The
first stage of development of this terminal is a $23 million
Massport investment to construct a dike and provide 36 acres of
fill.
B. Port Terminal Capacity: The capacity of each of
Massport's terminals has been estimated in terms of the amount of
cargo which the terminal is able to handle in a year. Capacity
is a function of both physical constraints and operating
practices. It should be thought of as a range rather than an
absolute limit. Within this range trade-offs may be made between
operating costs and volume handled. (10-1 and 10-3)
-29-
Some of the elements which limit terminal capacity are a
function of the physical layout of the terminal and may be
corrected by physical improvements; examples are the number of
berths and amount of warehouse space. Other constraints, such as
the turnover rate of cargo, are a function of shipper behavior
which may be influenced by actions such as an increase in
demurrage rates. A number of factors beyond the control of the
port also influence capacity, such as the size distribution of
the ships calling at the port and the frequency of calls.
Terminal capacity estimates were developed by ident-ifying
potentially constraining activities at each terminal (berth,
cranes, storage, gates, consolidation); analyzing theoretical
capacity and then modifying it based on actual operating
experience to include factors such as peaking, circulation
equipment downtime, and cargo density. The activity with least
capacity constrains capacity for the entire terminal.
The capacity estimates which follow were based on 1979
terminal operations and cargo mix. Any change in operations
(e.g. from stacked to mounted containers) or cargo mix (e.g.
ratio of empty to full containers) would impact the estimates.
These estimates represent the point beyond which increased
volume, although still feasible, will result in substantially
increased costs and waiting time. (10-3)
C. Moran Container Terminal in Charlestown is the largest
container terminal in New England. The 1,100-foot berth, with
two container gantry cranes and 22 acres of storage area, handles
an average of 26 ships per month, making it one of the busiest
terminals for its size in the world. In 1980, 5^0,922 tons of
containerized cargo were handled at Moran.
Moran serves New England shippers and consumers by providing
direct and feeder service from New England to all foreign ports.
The availability of these port services in Boston saves New
England shippers approximately $27 per ton in transportation
costs over alternative ports.
Moran Terminal was opened in 1971 as Boston's first public
container terminal. It is operated in conjunction with a
"stuffing and stripping" shed at Mystic Pier 1 where less than
container load cargo is handled.
Based on 1979 operating practices, Booz Allen estimated that
Moran has the capacity to handle 53,250 containers per year with
one crane; with both cranes operating capacity increases to
82,500 containers. If containers were stored on chassis the
terminal's capacity would be reduced to 5*4,050 containers per
year. (10-i»)
In 1979, Moran operated at 95t of theoretical capacity. It
should be noted that during this period the terminal was
operating with one crane at unusually high levels of berth
utilization and labor overtime, resulting in uneconomic costs to
both Massport and carriers using the terminal. (10-6)
-30-
m
\
7)
MDRAN CONTAINtR TERMINAL - CHAIUJISTOWN
1100 foot berth
2 cranes
21. S acre ttOTage yard
7.9 acrei auxilllary atorage
250,000 aq. ft. atufflng and stripping shed
Capacity: 53, 2 SO containers (stacked) (one crane)
82,S00 containers (stacked) (two cranes)
S4,050 containers (on chassis)
CARGO
1975
000 's of cons 265
Containers 2A,452
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
444
433
594
581
541
37.966
36.674
53.870
49.425
44.722
-31-
In the last three years Massport has undertaken a
multimillion dollar investment program at Moran to improve
services to shippers and shipping lines using the terminal.
Further expansion at Moran is constrained by limited acreage
since the terminal is sited between a U.S. Gypsum factory and an
iron scrap export terminal. As a result expanded container
handling capacity in the Port of Boston will be provided by
Massport's new terminals at Castle Island and the former Naval
Annex. -
D. Conley Terminal (formerly Castle Island) in South Boston is
the major terminal in the Port of Boston for the discharge of
lumber, automobiles, and breakbulk general cargo. Conley
Terminal provides 4255 feet of marginal wharf, with water depths
of 35 to 40 feet supported by 101 acres and a 220,000 square-foot
shed for general cargo and less-than-containerload operations.
The terminal handled 226,259 tons of cargo in 1980.
Berth ^^l?, at the eastern end of Conley Terminal, is leased
to Sea Land Services, Inc., which provides steamship services to
some 50 world ports via weekly feeder to New York. It is
Boston's original container facility. The Sea Land complex
includes a 17 .5-ton-capacity Paceco gantry crane and over 10
acres of paved area capable of storing more than 450 containers
on chassis at one time.
Berth // 1 6 , adjacent to the Sea Land Terminal, is leased by
Toyota which imported 29,115 automobiles in 1980. Other cargo
handled at Conley Terminal in 1980 included 23,644 Subarus, more
than 15 million gross board feet of lumber imported from British
Columbia, fuel oil for storage at Texaco's adjacent terminal, as
well as both containerized and breakbulk general cargo.
To accommodate increased container volume expected in the
1980's, Massport has invested $18 million at the western end of
Conley Terminal to convert Berth 11 into New England's newest
container terminal. The new terminal is a two crane facility
with 1,000 feet of marginal wharf and a storage yard of ten
acres. The yard acreage will be increased as demand grows. As
additional acreage is required for container handling, some of
the neo-bulk cargos will be relocated to Massport's new Marine
terminal complex at the former Navel Annex.
The new Berth 11 terminal, the first major seaport
development in Boston since 1972, was completed the fall of 1981.
Based on 1979 tonnage, operations, and acreage allocations,
Conley Terminal had the estimated capacity to handle 23,400
containers at Sealand's leased facility, 51,000 automobiles, 80
million gross board feet of lumber and 150,000 tons of break-bulk
general cargo. (10-8 and 10-9) The acreage allocations at Conley
can easily be adjusted to increase capacity to handle one
commodity, while decreasing capacity for another.
-32-
OONIEY TERMTWL -
1979
USES: SeaLand Cleased)
Toyota (leased)
Subaru
Umber
Texaco
13 acres
22.8 acres
8 acres
10 acres
6.1 acres
General Cargo 13
New Terminal 13
(cooplete in late 1981)
MDC 2
Access and
circulation 13
acres
acres
acres
acres
FACILITIES (1979)
CAPAcrry (i979)
Container berth
General berthing
Container cranes
Container storage
595 feet
3660 feet
one
10 acres
23,400 containers
50,610 autos
80 million GBF limber
CARGO
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
Containers
14,632
16,920
14,128
17,255
19,039
20,209
Autos
33,274
41,414
42,244
53,857
42,418
52,759
Umber
(000 's GBF)
20,465
53,347
43,348
52,908
40,237
17,597
BreaMjulk
(tons)
31,619
33,849
76,995
70,525
43,731
19.647
-33-
The twenty-five acre area allocated for storage of lumber and
Subarus is presently used to capacity whenever discharge of the
two cargos coincides requiring maximum storage for Subarus and
lumber simultaneously. Lumber and Subaru vessels call once a
month each, on the average. Cargo is stored on the terminal for
up to two weeks. More frequent vessels calls and faster turnover
would result in higher annual capacity at Conley for these
commodities. Booz Allen estimated that Conley had the capacity
to handle three times its 1979 level of autos and lumber. This
type of capacity increase is beyond the direct control =of the
terminal operator.
The new Berth 11 container facility will increase Boston's
container capacity by 24,500 containers. Conversion of
additional acreage to container storage will increase capacity by
2,450 containers per acre. Up to five acres can be made
available with minor re-allocation of terminal activities.
Beyond this, relocation of either lumber or auto imports to the
Massport Marine Terminal will be required.
Maximum container development at Conley (3 berths and 75
acres) would yield capacity of 135,000 containers, assuming
chassis storage.
E. The Massport Marine Terminal includes acreage at the former
South Boston Naval Annex, the Navy Recreation property in South
Boston, the Army Base, Commonwealth Flats, and Commonwealth Pier.
At the Naval Annex, Massport has undertaken a large-scale
seaport construction project which will provide the Port of
Boston with container handling facilities into the next century.
The site, 11 acres of land and 36 acres of water, was leased by
the Authority from the City of Boston in 1979 after several years
of intense negotiations. When fully developed for container
handling it will comprise a 3-berth, 4-crane, M7 acre terminal
with 2700 feet of marginal wharf.
During the initial stage of construction, which began in
1980, the original finger piers were removed. Within the next
three years the 11-acre north jetty will be rehabilitated and 36
acres of water area adjacent to the existing pier face will be
filled in. Construction of a dike around the fill site has been
completed. Fill operations, which began during the spring of
1981 will continue for several years. A portion of the 1.2
million cubic yards of material required to fill the 36 acres now
under water will be purchased from the MBTA as it is excavated
from the Southwest Corridor construction project.
-34-
MASSPORT-HARINi: TIRMINAL COMPLEX - 1979
Berth
AcreaKe
Covered
Storage
Comnonweelth Flats
•
10
.
Army
Bate
5465 ft.
.
865,000
Anne]
.
.
•
5465 ft.
10
B65.000
Additional Capacity
1980:
Annex
1000 ft.
•
0
19B1:
Annex
•
10.72
.
Navy Rec.
-
15.8
-
1982:
Annex
-
B
.
1983:
Annex
-
16
-
1984:
Annex
-
12
72.52
acres
•
6465 ft.
865.000 aq.ft
1985-
90 Annex
2000 ft.
8465 ft.
-35-
The terminal will be used for the open storage of bulk and
neo-bulk cargo while the fill settles and compacts and until it
is required for container handling. Open storage areas at the
former Navy Recreation Property (15.8 acres) and Commonwealth
Flats (10 acres) will be used to store cargo such as imported
automobiles or salt which has been unloaded at the north Jetty
berth. The wharf shed and pier sheds at the Army Base are
presently used for warehousing and it is anticipated that this
use will continue. However these buildings and the Army Base
berths could be returned to cargo handling if justified by cargo
demand .
F. Future Terminal Demand: In 1979i Massport had 125 acres
available or under use for cargo handling at Moran, Conley, and
Commonwealth Flats, including 32 acres for container cargo, 5^
acres for other general and neo-bulk cargos, 17 acres under
development, and 20 acres leased for bulk cargo handling as
summarized in the table below:
STORAGE ACREAGE AS OF 1979 *
MORAN
CONLEY COWV FLATS TOTAL
1979
TONNAGE
GENERAL CARGO
Containeriied
Breakbulk
22
10
13
32
13
736,008
A3, 734
NEO-BULK
Automobiles
Lumber
31
10
31
10
46.008
35.209
BULK
Scrap (Schlavone)
Salt (Cargill)
Oil (Texaco)
AVAILABLE STORAGE
UNDER CONSTRUCTION
11.5
10
33.5 acres 80 acres
10 acres
11.5
3
6
7
10
123.5 acres
These bulk
cargos are
handled at leased
facilities by private
terminal operators
* Does not include apron, covered .torage. access or circulation areas. Also does not
include the Naval Annex leased in late 1979 or the Navy Rec Property acquired in 1981.
-36-
tho ^/hh^??^' ^^^^ acreage will have increased to 187 acres with
estimated ?hft°L''" ^nnex and Navy ^Rec propertill Vnd''it*"iS
Present oonA- ^^ ^°''*/ "^^^ ^^ "««^ ^°^ container handling.
th^Authoritv.s''^o^^Si'^""' additional capacity resulting fJom
table wh°ch/ollows? '^^^^l^P'"^"^ ^^^^^-^ -e summarized fn the
SBOKT
TORS
4.ooo,ooq
S.OOO.OOQ
2.000,00Q
1,000, ooq'
with Moru (tackad
■■ with HoraD od ebaasl*
• MMMM
19B0
1983
1990
1995
2000
1980'
by 3
1985-*
by 4
1990'
by 5
2000
Container storage acres
available
32
Total container capacity
(OOO's)
62
Container berth available 1700 ft 2700 ft
.1
106 lSl-179
87 133
3700 ft 6400 ft
212-241
327-356
Container tonnage capacity 1,128 1,646-1,968 2,346-2,668 3,662-3,984
COOO's)
Total acreage available for
non-container cargo 91.5 124.5 99.5 52.5
faisher contiincr cipicity astuncs ittcked itorare at Noran, lower
capacity assuaes chassis storage at all terminals
See previous table for breakdown by terainal
JO additional acres at Conley for containers; add 47 new acres at
Annex and 16 new acres at Navy Kec.
25 additional acres at Conley for containers;
47 additional acres at Annex for containers
-37-
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